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Hjortland, Ole Thomassen
Harmony and the context of deducibility
Insolubles and consequences, 105–117, Tributes, 18, Coll. Pubs., London, 2012
03AOL5 03B47
Hjortland’s article formulates a challenge — the “substructural challenge” — for
“logical inferentialism”. Logical inferentialism is a bundle of doctrines which
agree in the core claim that the meaning of logical constants is (or can be)
fixed by inference rules which govern their use in proofs. Theories incorpo-
rating this claim have been proposed by Dummett (cf. MR0439563 as well
as [2]), Martin-Lo¨f (cf. MR1387767, MR0921834), Prawitz (cf. MR0546430,
MR0921837, MR2228441), and Schroeder-Heister (cf. MR2926608, MR2933786,
MR2228442, MR0676850) among others.
After a brief introduction, Hjortland describes the historical background
of inferentialism starting with Prior’s [3] famous note, which puts forward an
objection against this doctrine, and ending with a brief account of the various
proposals towards a regulative principle which overcomes Prior’s objection by
delimiting the class of proper meaning explanations via inference rules. Already
Gentzen, in his seminal PhD-thesis (MR1545497 and MR1545507) published in
1934/35, hints at such a principle in a brief remark. There he explains that in
the application of an elimination rule to a complex formula A ◦B, this formula
may only be used as that which it means according to the introduction rule for
the connective ◦ (“[. . . ] darf die betreffende Formel [. . . ] nur ‘als das benutzt
werden, was sie auf Grund der Einfu¨hrung dieses Zeichens bedeutet’”; p. 189 of
MR1545497). Thus there must be a certain harmony between introduction and
elimination rules. In section 4 of his article, Hjortland presents and explains
the principle of “general elimination harmony” (GE-harmony) due to Read [4].
Pior’s example of a set of meaning defining rules for a new binary connective
tonk which, if added to a consistent system, renders that system inconsistent is
ruled out by that principle.
The central part of Hjortland’s article (sections 5 and 6 and the conclusion)
develops an argument which is parallel to that put forward by Prior. It is based
on the fact that rules for a connective adhering to the principle of GE-harmony
may imply what would be called a structural rule in a sequent system. So-
called multiplicative conjunction ⊗ provides an example for this. Multiplicative
conjunction is the connective characterized (in a sequent system) by Ketonen’s
(cf. MR0017228) reformulation of Gentzen’s original rules.
A,B,Γ ⇒ C
A⊗B,Γ ⇒ C
Γ1,⇒ A Γ2 ⇒ B
Γ1,Γ2 ⇒ A⊗B
As is readily seen, contraction is derivable from these two rules (and dilution).
Now it is well known that the derivation of Curry’s antinomy (cf. MR0007366)
requires contraction (in a sequent system or some principle such as [A→ [A→
B]] → [A → B] in a Hilbert-type system). Hjortland’s argument may then be
described as follows. There are formal systems which are (a) consistent, (b)
incorporate unrestricted comprehension, but whose underlying logic is (c) sub-
structural since they lack the rule of contraction. According to Curry’s result
(in MR0007366) extending such a system by multiplicative conjunction will ren-
der that system inconsistent (by Curry’s antinomy) although natural deduction
rules for ⊗ can be set up which conform to the principle of GE-harmony. The
addition of ⊗ changes what Hjortland, following Belnap [1], calls “the context of
deducibility”, namely the set of basic assumptions concerning the consequence
relation. It is a case of “structural nonconservativeness” (sec. 6 of Hjortland’s
article). That harmony principles, such as GE-harmony, do not exclude such
cases of nonservativeness for the extension of substructural systems is exactly
the “substructural challenge” for logical inferentialism.
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